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Abstract 
Wireless mobile grids (WMG) have been proposed as the next generation mo­
bile networks in order to address the energy issues arising for the next generation 
of mobile phones. WMG are based on the notion that local communication is 
more energy-efﬁcient than the standard 3G communication. Despite their energy 
advantages, they create a social dilemma as it is advantageous for rational users 
to beneﬁt from the energy savings without any contributing to the cooperation, 
as every commitment has its price. This paper proposes the use of a normative 
framework modelling technique and multi-agent simulations to support the early 
and rapid development of prototype systems to analyse solutions for solving the 
collaboration dilemma in WMG. Both tools allow for the capture of essential fea­
tures of interactions between components in open architectures, therefore assisting 
in concept reﬁnement, identiﬁcation of actors, policy exploration and the feasibil­
ity assessment of new systems. With the help of these models we show how it is 
possible to quantify energy consumption, explore management policies and eval­
uate individual utility functions, all of which act as drivers in helping realise the 
WMG concept. 
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1. Introduction 
The development and deployment costs for new technology and intra-structure 
in mobile communication are extremely high both from a time and ﬁnancial per­
spective. Sufﬁciently rich simulation environments can signiﬁcantly reduce the 
costs. Thanks to their ﬂexibility and rapid prototyping approach, models and 
strategies can easily be tested and evaluated. This paper focusses on cost-efﬁcient 
techniques for modelling and the evaluation of strategies for reducing battery 
consumption in next-generation mobile networks (NGMNs)1. The novelty of 
our approach lies in the combination of a formal model—called a normative 
framework—that permits design-time veriﬁcation of model properties, with a bottom-
up agent-based simulation, that offers empirical runtime validation of system be­
haviour. In consequence, we be conﬁdent in the accuracy of the formal model, 
while at the same time being able to look for both gross system properties and 
emergent properties that would not otherwise be apparent in an design-time model. 
The particular NGMN scenario we are interested in are wireless mobile grids 
(WMG) that have been proposed to address the energy issues in NGMN. At 
present, the deployment of third generation (3G) of mobile network systems is 
in progress, but a quite different next generation network (called Fourth Genera­
tion or 4G) is under development that is intended to cause a paradigm shift in the 
cooperation architecture of wireless communication Katz and Fitzek (2006), with 
the main to drastically reduce the battery consumption. 
Batteries have ﬁxed capacity that puts limits on the operational time for a de­
vice in one charge cycle. The increasing sophistication of mobile phones and their 
evolution into smart phones offering Internet access, imaging (still and video), au­
dio and access to new services, has had a signiﬁcant impact on power consump­
1We understand the term NGMN as deﬁned by the NGMN Alliance as distinct notation for 
the next generation of mobile wireless networks. The term “NGMN” is technology-agnostic and 
does not refer to one speciﬁc technology or technical standard, but to a range of technologies and 
standards with certain minimum characteristics, of which the most prominent ones are: 
•	 The support of data rates up to 100 Mbit/s in the downlink (i.e. from the network to the 
end-user terminal) and up to 50 Mbit/s in the uplink (i.e. from the end-user terminal to the 
network) within a 20 MHz channel bandwidth; and 
•	 a low end-to-end latency (round trip time for data packets) of less than 30 ms (Alliance, 
2006). 
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tion, leading to shorter stand-by times, as well as the problem of rising battery 
temperature unless there is active cooling (Perrucci et al., 2009). 
Fitzek and Katz (2007) have proposed a way around some of these issues 
with the concept of a ‘WMG’, in which users share resources in a peer-to-peer 
fashion that uses less power but this requires a difﬁcult to obtain collaboration 
between the users. The social dilemma thereby is that the network users can 
show strategic behaviour. Thus the main problem in WMG is that commitment 
in these networks comes at a cost in the form of battery consumption, etc. As a 
consequence, rational users would prefer to access the resources without any own 
commitment. However, if a substantial number of users would follow this selﬁsh 
strategy, the network itself would be at stake, depriving all users from the beneﬁts 
(Wrona and Ma¨ho¨nen, 2006). 
In Balke et al. (2011) we reported on a feasibility study into how and whether 
normative frameworks can assist in evaluating the functionality of NGMN and 
presented a design-time (alsos called off-line) model focussing on enforcing co­
operation. Starting from this idea, the contribution of this paper is two-fold: (i) We 
build a normative design-time model of the wireless grid cooperation problem in 
order to provide a foundational model to quantify the potential WMG beneﬁts if 
enforcement can take place. (ii) The second contribution is the construction of a 
complementary empirical agent-based simulation, where in contrast to the design-
time model, we model the (normative) behaviour of individual actors—in this 
case, the handsets (or their users: the distinction is unimportant)—participating 
in the WMG. Through such a simulation, we can collect empirical evidence that 
is the accumulation of the local decision processes of signiﬁcant populations of 
handsets, to see how individual utility functions contribute to or hinder the real­
ization of the WMG vision. After the construction of the two models (design and 
runtime), in a second step we show how the design-time and the runtime model 
(within the simulation) work together and how their combination helps to analyse 
the cooperation problem. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section (Sec­
tion 2) we present a detailed description of the NGMN scenario that we use as a 
case-study in this paper (i.e. the idea of WMG), an analysis of the energy costs 
of the different networks that have motivated the idea and examine the reciprocity 
problem in the framework of the classical game theory Prisoner’s Dilemma model, 
concluding that (without enforcement mechanism) non-collaboration is the pre­
ferred course of action. However, that is precisely not the outcome we seek. For 
the collaboration to succeed, individuals must have suitable incentives not to de­
fect, and it is the purpose of the normative framework to provide the context in 
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Figure 1: WMG Communication Architecture 
which those incentives are attractive. Thus, in Section 3, we brieﬂy outline the 
formal modelling framework we have developed and its computational realization 
in Answer Set Programming, before moving on (Section 4) to describe a design-
time WMG model for an idealized scenario in which some actors download some 
parts of some digital content individually, but also share the downloaded parts 
with each other. This enables us to quantify, in terms of battery consumption 
the beneﬁts of using a WMG. In Section 5, we describe the runtime agent-based 
simulation, where we explore the same scenario from the perspective of individ­
ual decision-makers and can collect data about overall system behaviour, in order 
to contrast it with that of the normative model. In conclusion, in Section 6, we 
discuss how these two views on modelling potential future technological devel­
opments complement one another and consider how they may be connected in 
future so that high-level system objectives may directly inﬂuence low-level deci­
sion making in distributed, adaptive systems. Please note that, at variance with 
standard practice, there is no single related work section. Instead, because of the 
way in which our contributions combines research from several areas, we discuss 
and cite key papers in the relevant sections. 
2. The Reciprocity Problem in Wireless Mobile Grids 
2.1. The Wireless Mobile Grid Architecture 
As described in section 1, to overcome the energy problems of NGMN, Fitzek 
and Katz (2007) proposed the establishment of so-called WMG as shown in Fig­
ure 1. In WMG, ubiquitous mobile devices with potentially different capabilities 
are expected to build ad-hoc connections, to cooperate and to share their limited 
resources for the beneﬁt of the community. The cooperation between devices is 
realised through the use of a short range communication link, such as WLAN or 
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Bluetooth. Compared to the standard cellular HSDPA communication via a base-
station, the advantage of short-range communication is much higher bandwidth at 
the cost of much less power, as shown Section 2.2 (Perrucci et al., 2009). Here 
we focus on the IEEE802.11 WLAN speciﬁcation, that permits mobile devices to 
communicate directly with each other and, according to Perrucci et al. (2009), has 
the highest energy saving potential2. 
For a better understanding of the WMG proposal, we brieﬂy present a scenario 
for use in the rest of the paper. The scenario is London’s ﬁnancial district, which 
is highly interesting from an infrastructure provider’s point of view, because of the 
high number of potential customers as well as the problems arising from the high 
density of mobile phone users. In consequence, the network may easily become 
overloaded and quality of service deteriorate. The reason for this is straightfor­
ward: we may assume some network users want to download video-streams such 
as ﬁnancial news from a single base station, that uses the conventional multicast 
technique, whereby the bandwidth of the base station is divided into several sub-
slots (‘channels’), that are sent out sequentially within one time frame. Thus – 
up to a technology-deﬁned maximum – each mobile phone is assigned one slot. 
As the total bandwidth of a base station is ﬁxed, the more mobile phone users 
are assigned a slot, the smaller the bandwidth gets that can be allotted to a sin­
gle channel. As a result download times increase, leading both to higher battery 
consumption as well as lower quality of the streaming service. 
In contrast to the normal ‘non-cooperative’ scenario, where a single mobile 
phone user would need to receive all sub-streams over the cellular link, resulting 
in the problems identiﬁed above, cooperation in the form of a WMG, enables users 
to share the task by receiving a subset of the multicast channels over the cellular 
link from and acquiring the remaining parts over the short range link. 
2.2. The Energy Advantage in IEEE802.11 
To understand the IEEE802.11 WLAN WMG scenario and its energy impli­
cations better, this section details various technical aspects of the communication 
costs. We can express energy consumption E in terms of two factors: the power 
P consumed per connection type and the time t taken for transmission: 
Energy = Power ∗ Time [Joules] (1) 
2In contrast to 802.11 WLAN, Bluetooth does not permit direct communication between indi­
vidual mobile devices, but rather the concept of a master device that is connected to a maximum 
number of seven slave devices. The slave devices can only communicate via their master, hence 
more data exchange is needed. 
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Table 1: Power Level and Data Rate for Cellular - 100 byte 
state power value [W] data rate [Mbps] 
receiving 1,314 0,193

idle 0,661 ­

Table 2: Power Level and Data Rate for WLAN Broadcast - 1000 byte 
state	 power value [W] data rate [Mbps] 
sending 1,629 5,623 
receiving @ 3m 1,375 5,379 
receiving @ 30 m 1,213 5,115 
idle @ 3m 0,979 -
idle @ 30m 0,952 -
The total energy consumption is the energy consumed over the cellular 3G con­
nection (E3G) plus that over the short link (i.e. WLAN) connection (EWLAN ). In 
case of no cooperation the latter costs 0, i.e. it is assumed that the WLAN con­
nection is turned off and the user has to stream the complete video using the 3G 
connection. In case of WMG, it is assumed that both connections (WLAN and 
3G) are turned on and the devices help one another in a peer-to-peer-like fashion. 
We use A to denote the set of users and ACoop to denote those that are cooperating. 
Thus given 
���ACoop ��� cooperating users, each only needs to stream a part of the total 
video via the base station (i.e. 1 in an ideal scenario) and obtain the remainder |ACoop|
from the cooperation partners via the short link. Thus, total energy consumption 
in the cooperative case (ECoop) comprises3 that for: 
•	 streaming part of the video from the base station using the 3G link: E3G,rx, 
•	 receiving the remaining video chunks on the WLAN connection: EWLAN,rx, 
•	 transmitting the user’s own chunks to the other participants via the WLAN 
connection: EWLAN,tx, and 
•	 idling, that is when not transmitting or receiving anything but waiting for 
the next interaction on either connections: EWLAN,i + E3G,i 
3Of course in order to receive at optimal results, the users need to negotiate which user is 
downloading which chunk and each user only asks for that speciﬁc chunk from the base station. 
For a simpler presentation and analysis this issue is neglected here, but we account for it in the 
latter part of the paper. 
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Figure 2: The Reciprocity Problem in WMG 
By substituting the respective P ∗ t-values into Equation 1, one can analyse 
the power consumption as well as the transmission times of the scenario in the 
cooperative and non-cooperative case in detail. Representative power and time 
values for the transmission in different states using 3G and WLAN connection are 
reported in Perrucci et al. (2009, p. D10)4. We reproduce their results in Tables 1 
and 2. These ﬁgures are for a Nokia N95 running Symbian OS v9.2. They show 
that although the power needed for the WLAN and the 3G state are about the same, 
the data rate for the 3G link (0.193 Mbit/s for the receiving state) is signiﬁcantly 
lower than that of WLAN (5.115 Mbit/s, receiving state, 30m distance) leading to 
a signiﬁcantly worse energy per bit ratio for the 3G link5. 
This suggests that the cooperation scenario has a signiﬁcant potential advan­
tage in energy consumption, compared to the conventional cellular communica­
tion architecture, especially if the number of cooperating mobile phones is high 
and a large proportion of the data transmission can be done via the short-link 
connection. 
2.3. The Reciprocity Problem in Wireless Mobile Grids 
Although the WMG scenario suggests potential advantages with regard to bat­
tery consumption, it also has the intrinsic weakness of any distributed cooperative 
architecture: it relies on cooperation to succeed. We depict the idea of cooperation 
in WMG in Figure 2(a), and describe it as follows: 
4According to the authors of the paper, these data are representative for large amounts of data 
transmitted. 
5The energy consumed in the idle states is not measured in (Perrucci et al., 2009). 
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•	 The participants volunteer their resources, forming a common pool which 
can be used by all, in order to achieve a common goal, such as ﬁle streaming. 
The utility that users can obtain from the pooled resources is higher than 
they achievable individually. However, the problem is that commitment 
comes at a cost, in the form of battery consumption for sending ﬁle chunks, 
i.e. EWLAN,tx. 
•	 In consequence, rational users would prefer to access the resources without 
any commitment of their own. Thus, as shown in Figure 2(b), the grey user 
in the top left corner (with mask) can enjoy the advantages of the common 
pool without committing anything itself, hence cheating on the three other 
users. 
However, if a substantial proportion of users follow this selﬁsh strategy, the 
network itself is at stake, depriving all users of the beneﬁts (Wrona and M¨ onen,ah¨
2006). The reason for this is straightforward: network users can have strategic 
behaviour and do not necessarily obediently cooperate in making their resources 
available, without the prospect of reward for good behaviour. Unreciprocated, 
there is no inherent value to cooperation for a user. A lone cooperating user draws 
no beneﬁt, even if the rest of the network does. Guaranteed cost paired with 
uncertainty or even lack of any resulting beneﬁt does not induce cooperation in 
a rational, utility-maximising user. Without any further incentives, rational users 
therefore would not cooperate in such an environment and all be worse off than if 
they cooperated (Axelrod, 1981; Ostrom, 1999). 
Let us consider the problem from a game-theoretic point of view: the individ­
uals are caught in a prisoners dilemma (PD) as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The Free Riding Problem as car­
dinal PD 
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Figure 4: The Free Riding Problem as ordi­
nal PD 
Figure 3 shows the relative payoffs for a WMG user and a potential coopera­
tion partner. The payoffs are shown in terms of energy savings for each transaction 
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partner in comparison to the option of a participant downloading everything itself. 
We distinguish three cases: 
•	 In case of full cooperation the energy saving potential is equivalent to Eno coop−
Ecoop (i.e. simply the energy gained by cooperating in contrast to doing ev­
erything oneself) for each partner6. 
•	 In case where one partner defects, it gains an additional payoff EWLAN,tx, be­
cause it saves energy by not sending its ﬁle chunks to its partner. The other 
partner does not receive the ﬁle chunks and has to download the remaining 
ones itself. Consequently, it downloads everything itself (i.e. has no energy 
saving with regard to the download) and in addition has additional energy 
costs for sending its ﬁle chunks. 
•	 The last case shows the payoffs for both partners defecting. In this case they 
both have to download everything themselves leading to a payoff of 0 for 
both partners. 
Using these values to develop on ordinal order of preferences for both players 
the PD is as shown in ﬁgure 4. For both players the ordinal order of preferences 
is 1 � 2 � 3 � 4. Hence the dominant strategy for both players is strictly not 
to cooperate. If the other one cooperates, no cooperation is better because it can 
gain EWLAN,tx and if the other player does not cooperate, no cooperation is still 
the better option, as one would not have the advantages deriving from cooperation 
(the chunks the other one is sending) and still has to carry the transmission costs 
EWLAN,tx. 
Looking at the total welfare of the interaction (i.e. the combined payoffs of 
both partners) it becomes obvious that the result from the individual preferences is 
the worst case, as the total welfare is 0, compared to potentially 2∗(Enocoop −Ecoop) 
in the case of cooperation. Hence, although an overall beneﬁcial result is possible, 
individual preferences lead to a non-beneﬁcial state. 
From this analysis, it becomes evident that for WMG in particular and NGMN 
to be successful, there are not only technological, but also economic challenges 
to meet. Without understanding these economic issues, the work invested in de­
velopment of different protocols and transmission networks may bring only sub­
optimal results. Hence, the longer term aim of our research is the analysis of 
socio-economic policies to address the issues identiﬁed. Consequently, we intend 
to analyse how normative frameworks and different socio-economic enforcement 
6The absolute size of this energy difference depends both on the size of the ﬁle to download as 
well as on the number of cooperation partners, that is why ﬁgure 3 only uses relative payoffs. 
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mechanisms affect the cooperative behaviour in WMG and NGMN, as well as 
other systems, where this kind of cooperation dilemma appear (e.g P2P settings) 
using design- and run-time models. For us, what makes WMG a particularly inter­
esting object of study and distinguishes the concept from other systems (such as 
the cooperation problems in P2P settings) are the mobile phone speciﬁc resource 
restrictions (e.g. SIM card space, battery capacity) and features (mobility of the 
users), as well as its high expected impact in future 4G networks. Thus, current 
WMG scenarios by the mobile phone industry include cooperative streaming of 
videos at big sport events, the sharing of news and ﬁnancial data in banking dis­
tricts, IPTV, cooperative online gaming as well as cooperative downloads of maps 
and location information at airports, etc. Finally, due to the comparatively high 
rates of transmission failures of wireless applications, a further major challenge is 
answering the question of intention when non-cooperation is observed — was it 
the result of cheating or transmission failure? 
3. A Normative Framework to Explore the Prototyping of WMGs 
The essential idea of normative frameworks is a (consistent) collection of rules 
whose purpose is to describe a principle of right action binding upon the members 
of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable be­
haviour [Merriam-Webster dictionary]. These rules are stated in terms of events, 
speciﬁcally the events that matter for the for the purposes of the normative frame­
work. Thus an important aspect of the deﬁnition of a normative framework is 
how those events are observed. The key concept here is what Searle (1969) terms 
conventional generation, whereby an observable event in the environment is inter­
preted as a normative event, causing an update to the normative state, as illustrated 
in Figure 5. 
The formalization of this is quite simple, being deﬁned as conditional opera­
tions on a sets of terms that represent the normative state. The condition on an 
operation is typically expressed in terms of a combination of a set of terms and an 
event, while the operation is an action on the set of terms. One further key con­
cept is the distinction between a environment event and a normative event. This is 
perhaps best illustrated by an example: that someone dies is an event, but whether 
the individual was killed or was murdered is a fact that may only be established 
by a judicial process, which is a normative framework. This notion of attributing 
a normative label to a environmental event occurs frequently in legal and social 
frameworks and is known the “counts-as” principle (Jones and Sergot, 1996). 
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ObsEv1 ObsEv2 ObsEv3 ObsEv4
Normative Framework
fact1
fact′1
fact′2
fact′3
act1 fact′′1
fact′′3
act2
Figure 5: Conventional generation turns observations into normative facts 
The essential elements of our normative framework are: (i) events (E), that 
bring about changes in state, and (ii) ﬂuents (F ), that characterize the state at a 
given instant. The function of the framework is to deﬁne the interplay between 
these concepts over time, in order to capture the evolution of a particular insti­
tution through the interaction of its participants. We distinguish two kinds of 
events: normative events (Enorm), that are the events deﬁned by the framework and 
exogenous (Eex), that are outside its scope, but whose occurrence triggers norma­
tive events in a direct reﬂection of the “counts-as” principle discussed above. We 
summarize the elements of the formal model in Table 3. 
The semantics of the normative framework is deﬁned over a sequence, called 
a trace, of exogenous events. Starting from the initial state, each Eex is respon­
sible for a state change, through the initiation and termination of ﬂuents. This is 
achieved by a three-step process: (i) the transitive closure of G with respect to a 
given exogenous event determines all the generated (normative) events, (ii) to this 
all violations of events not permitted and obligations not fulﬁlled are added, giving 
the set of all events whose consequences determine the new state, (iii) the applica­
tion of C to this set of events identiﬁes all ﬂuents that are initiated and terminated 
with respect to the current state so giving the next state. For each trace, we can 
therefore compute a sequence of states that constitutes the model of the norma­
tive framework for that trace. This process is realized as a computational model 
through Answer Set Programming (Baral, 2003; Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991) and 
which is the subject of the evaluation process in Section 4.2. Cliffe et al. (2007) 
shows that the formal model of a normative framework can be translated to an 
AnsProlog program, such that the answer sets of the program correspond to the 
traces of the framework. A detailed description of the mapping can be found there. 
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Description Formalization 
Normative system N := �E, F , C, G, Δ�
Normative facts (ﬂuents), comprising 
power, permission, obligations and 
domain-speciﬁc facts 
F = W ∪ P ∪ O ∪ D 
Generation relation: maps a state and 
an event to a set of events 
G : X × E → 2Enorm 
Consequence relation: maps a state 
and an event to a pair of sets of ﬂu­
ents, where the ﬁrst are additions and 
the second are deletions 
C : X × E → 2F × 2F where C(X, e) = 
(C↑(φ, e), C↓(φ, e)) where 
(i) C↑(φ, e) initiates a ﬂuent 
(ii) C↓(φ, e) terminates a ﬂuent 
Events, comprising exogenous, (nor­
mative) actions and (normative) viola­
tions 
E = Eex∪Enorm with Enorm = Eact ∪Eviol 
The initial set of ﬂuents Δ 
State formula, being the set of positive 
and negative ﬂuents that comprise the 
current normative state 
X = 2F ∪¬F 
Table 3: Formal speciﬁcation of the normative framework 
4. The Design-time Model of the Wireless Mobile Grid Scenario 
4.1. The Normative Framework 
Now that we have described the wireless grid scenario in some detail from 
the technological perspective (Section 2) and outlined our approach to modelling 
normative frameworks (Section 3), we can combine these to present the intuition 
behind our normative model for wireless grids. The full model speciﬁcation can 
be found in Balke et al. (2011). 
Implementing a simulation environment is a complex and time-consuming 
task. Before starting the process it is best to verify that the protocol is indeed 
suitable for the task at hand. The normative model provides the protocol designer 
a means to verify, from a theoretical perspective, that the protocol is correct and 
the methods of enforcing collaboration between the users will indeed beneﬁt all 
participants in terms of reduced communication costs, battery costs and that none 
of the participants has an unfair advantage. 
The model given here is intentionally limited to focus on the essential inter­
actions and the communication costs that arise from those interactions. A more 
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elaborate model may be desirable for greater realism, but we believe that more 
details would largely distract and complicate, rather than add to the presentation. 
The base-station uses several different frequencies (frequency division mul­
tiplexing), allowing many users do download simultaneously. We refer to a fre­
quency division in the model as a channel. 
The features of the prototypical scenario are: (i) 1 × base-station: B, with 
C = {c1, . . . , cn} channels (ii) m × users with handsets: A = {a1, . . . , am}, (iii) 1 ×
digital good: G divided into, n chunks: {g1, . . . , gn}. We further assume that n|m, 
which is to say the number of chunks, is a multiple of the number of users. 
In the design-time model, we focus on the interaction between participants, 
neglecting the preceding phase of searching for cooperation partners. We identify 
three phases to the interactions for handset to base-station and handset to handset: 
1. Negotiation: assign gi to aj s.t. f : G A and→ 
f −1 : A G where f −1(ai) = {gj, . . .} and f (gj) = ai→ 
2. Downloading: handset ai receives chunks f −1(ai) from base-station B 
3. Sharing: handset a1 sends chunks f −1(ai) to and receives chunks G \ f −1(ai) 
from other handsets. 
While these three phases are distinguishable, they need not be sequential. Of 
course, the negotiation phase has to precede both the downloading and sending/re­
ceiving phases. Sharing is possible as soon as downloading has commenced; thus 
the two can be interleaved. In the following paragraphs we discuss the normative 
aspects of each phase in more detail. 
Negotiation Phase. In the design-time model, we are not particularly concerned 
with the technicalities of the negotiation phase — any off-the-shelf protocol could 
be employed — as long as the post-condition is satisﬁed: that each chunk is as­
signed to exactly one handset and that each handset is assigned the same number 
of chunks. These conditions can readily be relaxed at the cost of a lengthier spec­
iﬁcation. The pre-deﬁned allocation of chunks for downloading from the base-
station is represented in the initial state of the model using ﬂuents to associate 
handsets and chunks. In addition, each handset has the permission and power to 
download chunks. 
Downloading Phase. This is when each handset downloads its assigned chunks. 
This process should result in each handset holding n|m distinct chunks. In our 
model each handset can only physically obtain one chunk at a time from the base 
station, while each channel can only be used to download a single chunk. A 
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request to download a chunk is granted whenever there is an available channel and 
the handset is not currently receiving from the base-station and is not busy sending 
another chunk. When a chunk is downloaded, the handset and the channel are busy 
for a ﬁxed amount of time — 4 time steps in this case. From the ﬁrst instant of 
the handset interacting with the base-station, it is deemed to have downloaded the 
chunk, so parts can be shared. As soon as a channel and a handset are engaged, 
the framework (i) removes the power from the handset and from the channel to 
engage in any other interactions, (ii) stops the handset from needing the chunk 
and (iii) cancels the permission to download the chunk again later on. We model 
the passage of time by generating a transition for each exogenous event But, in 
case no handset is interacting with the normative framework, we use a clock event 
to achieve the same effect. Likewise , we use a transition event to count down the 
elapsed time channel/handset interaction. Thus, when an interaction comes to an 
end, power is restored to the handset to download chunks via the channel and for 
the handset to receive more chunks. 
Sharing Phase. In this phase each handset sends chunks to, or receives chunks 
from other handsets. At the end of the process, each handset has a complete set 
of the chunks, that is the entire digital good. The idea is similar to that for with 
downloading chunks from the base-station, only that we utilize a simple mech­
anism to encourage handsets to share their chunks with others instead of down­
loading them. Just as for downloading we must track handset activity, whether 
they busy and whether they are sending or receiving. A handset sharing a chunk 
can possibly trigger two normative events, indicating sending or receiving, de­
pending on the availability of the handsets and whether they have possession of 
the chunk or not. The duration for sending or receiving a chunk is set to 2 time 
steps. The time steps chosen for downloading and sending/receiving have been 
chosen arbitrarily to demonstrate the difference between the two communication 
mechanisms. They were kept relatively small to reduce the length of the traces 
while still allowing for possible simultaneous receiving and downloading. When 
a chunk is received from another handset, the handset loses permission to received 
another chunk until it has sent a chunk to another handset. Continuous receiving 
without sending results in a violation of the protocol. The penalty applied is that 
the violating handset permanently loses the power to receive, which means that 
for all intents and purposes it has been expelled from the collaboration group. 
Running the Model. When we translate the model into AnsProlog and run the 
program, we obtain all the possible traces over a speciﬁed number of time in­
stances. A successful trace is deﬁned as one in which all handsets have all chunks 
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and are no longer engaged. Figure 6 shows the graphical representation of a trace 
for a scenario with two handsets (bob and alice), four chunks (x1, x2, x3 and x4) 
and a base-station with two channels (c1,c2). The little circles indicate the time 
steps. If the circle is light grey this means the handset is busy receiving from the 
base-station, while darker grey indicates it is busy sending or receiving to/from 
another handset. Circles half light, half dark indicate the handset is both receiving 
from the base-station and another handset. The arrows indicate which chunk goes 
to which handset. The left-hand side labels indicate the exogenous event and the 
current distribution of chunks. 
4.2. Evaluation 
With the normative design-time model, we can examine the traces for expected 
and unexpected behaviour. Furthermore we can obtain an estimate for communi­
cation cost (the energy consumption) in each trace simply by counting the number 
and type of communication events for each handset, then using the corresponding 
information from Tables 1 and 2. 
At this stage the model is used as a design-time tool and generates all possible 
traces. As mentioned earlier, we are only interested in those traces that lead to 
success. Even so constrained, the model still generates a large number of valid 
traces. But on closer analysis, it becomes clear that the occurrence of most of 
these traces is a function of the relative intelligence and (bounded) rationality 
of the handset. For example, repeatedly trying the download a chunk when the 
handset is busy. The model purposely does not attempting to characterize handset 
behaviour—we believe that is responsibility of the handset designer—because our 
objective is the design of the space in which the handsets interact. However, these 
unnatural traces can easily be ﬁltered out by additional constraints on the Ans-
Prolog speciﬁcation, so that it retains only those traces in which an exogenous 
event leads to an normative event, reducing the number of traces signiﬁcantly. 
When verifying the model we distinguish between two types of traces: those 
that do not contain any violations and those that do. This can be easily accom­
plished by adding further ﬁlters on the traces. 
Our model has two types of violations, downloading unassigned chunks and 
receiving without sharing. In our current model no sanction is imposed on the 
former type of violation, as handsets are already penalised with a lower data rate. 
In the current model it is possible for a handset to take advantage of the protocol 
by violating it in order to obtain the last chunk after which the sanction does not 
have any effect. This is a typical situation in a game theoretic context, resulting 
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observed(download(alice,x1,c1),i01) 
alice={},bob={} 
observed(download(bob,x2,c2),i02) 
alice={x1},bob={} 
alice={x1},bob={x2} 
alice={x1},bob={x2} 
alice={x1},bob={x2} 
observed(send(alice,x1),i06) 
alice={x1},bob={x2} 
observed(download(bob,x4,c1),i07) 
alice={x1},bob={x1,x2} 
alice={x1},bob={x1,x2,x4} 
observed(download(alice,x3,c2),i09) 
alice={x1},bob={x1,x2,x4} 
alice={x1,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4} 
alice={x1,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4} 
observed(send(bob,x2),i12) 
alice={x1,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4} 
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4} 
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4} 
observed(send(alice,x3),i15) 
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4} 
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4} 
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4} 
observed(send(bob,x4),i18) 
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4} 
alice={x1,x2,x3,x4},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4} 
alice={x1,x2,x3,x4},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4} 
alice={x1,x2,x3,x4},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4} 
C1 C2 Alice Bob 
x1 
x2 
x1 
x4 
x3 
x2 
x3 
x4 
Figure 6: One trace of the interaction between alice, bob and the channels of base-station 
in the system reverting back to non-collaborative behaviour. To overcome this, a 
reputation mechanism could be used to penalise the handset in future interactions. 
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The current model takes a rather harsh position on sanctioning, in that the vi­
olating handset is expelled — the power to receive chunks from another handset 
is rescinded. In fact, this is both harsh and counter-productive, because given the 
initial state, the chunk assignment is not 1-resilient — meaning the distribution 
cannot be achieved in the case of the expulsion of 1 handset, except in the spe­
cial case where the expulsion occurs when the other handsets no longer require 
any chunks from this one. Full 1-resilient assignment can be achieved with two 
chunks for each of three handsets, in which each chunk is assigned to two handsets 
and of course, n-resilience can be achieved by each handset downloading all the 
chunks from the base-station. In terms of the effect on the group goal, the ejection 
scenario is equivalent to one of the handsets leaving the ad-hoc network. In either 
case (expulsion or departure), for an a-priori solution there is a trade-off to be ex­
plored in delivering i-resilience, based on the estimated number of handset failures 
and the additional cost of replicated base-station downloads. Alternatively, some 
handsets may engage autonomously in additional base-station downloads for the 
sake of the group goal. A more practical sanction may be to lock the offending 
handset out of the sharing process for a number of time steps, but as discussed 
above, the appropriateness of this depends on the impact on the group goal. 
The model also assumes alternating sending and receiving. In reality this 
might not always be the case. Handsets should be allowed to take advantage of 
chunks being sent even when the same number of chunks have not yet been shared. 
It might be more realistic to evaluate a handset’s willingness to collaborate over a 
larger time period. 
5. Simulating the Wireless Mobile Grid using an MAS Simulation 
5.1. NGMN as Multi-Agent-Systems 
Having presented the design time model, we now follow it with a runtime 
model, realized as simulation. The purpose of the runtime model is to allow us 
to explore the scenario from the perspective of the individual decision makers 
(handsets) and as a consequence collect data about the overall system behaviour. 
For the runtime model simulation we chose a Multi-Agent-System (MAS) sim­
ulation, using the well-established notion of agents as a metaphor to represent 
human users with their mobile phones in the simulation. Citing Ferber (1999) an 
agent is “a physical or virtual entity that (i) is capable of acting in an environ­
ment, (ii) can communicate directly with other agents, (iii) is driven by a set of 
tendencies (in the form of individual objector of a satisfaction/survival function 
which it tries to optimise), (iv) possesses resources of its own, (v) is capable of 
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perceiving its environment (but to a limited extent, (vi) has only a partial repre­
sentation of this environment (and perhaps none), (vii) possesses skills and can 
offer services, (viii) may be able to reproduce itself, (ix) has behaviour tending to­
wards satisfying its objectives, taking account of the resources and skills available 
to it and depending on its perception, its representations and the communications 
it receives.” 
Keeping this deﬁnition in mind, in a NGMN a user together with his mobile 
phone (as one entity) can be seen as an agent. Thus, the users with their phones 
act in the environment and interact with other users, each being driven by their 
own objectives (ﬁle download and energy saving) as well as being constrained 
by resource limitations (battery capacity and bandwidth). The actions the users 
perform are, on the one hand based on their perception of their environment, (e.g. 
of the other users and their actions) and on the other on their resources (e.g. ﬁles 
they have and need) as well as utility considerations (battery costs for different 
actions). 
A MAS is a system composed of multiple interacting agents that all make 
their own decisions based on their own goals, utilities and resources. Thus, in 
contrast to other forms of simulation the overall system behaviour is not encoded 
by the simulation designer in advance, but the macro behaviour results from the 
individual decision and actions of the agents (i.e. a micro-level driven macro 
result). Hence, using MAS simulation for simulating the actions and interactions 
of autonomous agents one gets a chance to asses the macro effects on the system 
as a whole that result from micro-behaviour of the individual agents, something 
that is particularly suitable for the problems discussed earlier. 
What happens in the course of the simulation itself is that at each step, agents 
receive an observation from the environment, change their internal state and take 
an action — which may even be to do nothing — that is ﬁnally executed. The in­
ternal state of an agent possibly encodes its history of actions and observations, its 
beliefs about the state of the environment, as well as its own preferences. The in­
ternal state evolves by integrating observations from its environment. The agent’s 
decision function reﬂects its behaviour or policy and determines which action it 
will take in the next step. 
As indicated earlier, one of the most important features of MAS simulation is 
how the agent actions lead to observable system level macro behaviour. It is for 
this reason that, in order to explain the simulation in more detail, that we ﬁrst look 
at the actions an agent can perform (see section 5.2), in which we observe that we 
explicitly allow for cheating by the agents, i.e. leave it as an action-option to them. 
The implementation of these actions as well as the agents and the environment was 
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Figure 7: Download Considerations by the Participants 
realized using the Jason Simulation Platform (Bordini et al., 2007). 
5.2. The Agent Decision Process 
This section serves to explain the decision process of the agents in the simula­
tion. Starting from Figure 7 that shows the agent’s a decision tree, we discuss how 
an agent decides in favour of a particular action. The basis for decision-making 
are simple utility considerations, but how it arrives at different utility values will 
be now be explained together with an illustration of the nodes in the decision tree. 
For ease of reference, we have numbered the decision nodes in Figure 7 from 
1 to 6, and will refer to these when discussing the respective nodes. When an 
agent wants to download a ﬁle, it sequentially goes through the nodes 1 to 6 and 
every time decides whether it should download the ﬁles itself (DS) or whether to 
go on to the next decision node. 
Node: 1 Wanting to download a ﬁle, the agent starts at node 1 and considers the 
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opportunity costs of the download. These are the battery costs accumu­
lating for searching for and negotiating with potential cooperation part­
ners. If these costs are higher than the gain from a cooperative download 
(i.e. higher than the saved energy if the cooperation is successful), the 
agent will download the ﬁle itself. Since the energy saving from a coop­
erative download depends on ﬁle size, we compare this information (and 
the resulting minimum energy gains in case of a successful cooperation) 
against the minimum energy needed for sending 1 cooperation request 
and 1 negotiation message. Hence, if the ﬁle is large enough for the co­
operative download energy saving to outweigh the opportunity costs, the 
agent will move to node 2 (otherwise it will simply download the ﬁle 
itself). 
Node: 2 At node 2, the next consideration for the agent is the perceived system 
risk. In the simulation, this risk has a value between 0 and 1 (with 0 be­
ing no risk and 1 being the highest risk possible). The perceived system 
risk is that which the agent has with regard to the environment in which 
it is interacting. To illustrate: if a system is highly monitored, rules to 
counter defection are in place and furthermore, there is a high chance 
of seeing cooperation partners again, the perceived system risk will be 
low; in contrast in an open distributed system without any enforcement 
possibilities (such as in the case of the wireless grids if no cooperation 
ensuring measures are taken) it will approach 1. The higher the per­
ceived system risk (i.e. the closer the value is to 1), the more likely the 
agent will download the ﬁle itself. In the opposite case, it will go on to 
decision node 3 where the number of neighbours is determined7. 
Node: 3 This step is straight forward and is an environmental enquiry rather than 
an actual decision. If this number is too low (e.g. if it cannot ﬁnd many 
other agents in its vicinity) then sending a cooperation request has little 
point, since it only costs battery and will not result in enough responses, 
so the agent downloads the ﬁle itself. If the number of neighbours is 
high enough, it does the opposite, i.e. sends out a cooperation request8 
7The decisions in node 2 and 3 need not necessarily be made in this order but could be made 
simultaneously, for reasons of simplicity we however assume sequential ordering. 
8In the simulation implementation a further case is distinguished: the agent receives a cooper­
ation request from another agent in its vicinity. If this request matches its interest, i.e. the request 
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to its neighbours via an IEEE802.11 WLAN broadcast and waits for 
responses. 
Node: 4 Decision node 4 is similar to node 3, only this time the agent checks 
for the number of responses to its cooperation message rather than the 
number of neighbours. 
Node: 5 Having received enough responses in decision step 5, the agent checks 
who has responded and decides whether it wants to work with the other 
agents. Thus, in reality an agent might get a response from an agent 
that has cheated on it before or which for other reasons does not seem 
trustworthy in its eyes and therefore could decide not to cooperate with 
this agent. 
Node: 6 Having agreed to join a cooperation group, ﬁnally, in decision step 6, the 
agent has two tasks. First of all it has to decide whether to download its 
promised share for the cooperation group from the base-station and more 
importantly, having downloaded its share, decide whether to cooperate 
(i.e. send its share to its cooperation partners) or to defect (i.e. not send 
its share). This decision is based on the utilities from the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma described earlier as well as possible follow-up costs. Thus, if 
it defects but is likely to be levied a ﬁne under these circumstances, the 
original utilities from the PD change and it might be advantageous to 
cooperate instead. In contrast, with no follow-up costs the original PD 
will be relevant and defection will always be the better option. 
Having made its decision, the last step (which however is not a decision and 
so does not appear in Figure 7) is to wait and see whether the cooperation partners 
have sent their promised shares. If shares are missing, the agent has to go through 
the decision process again and can decide whether to download the missing shares 
itself or whether to try to ﬁnd new cooperation partners. 
5.3. Implementation 
5.3.1. The Agent Decision Process 
Having explained the basic utility-based download considerations of the agents, 
in this section, we describe their implementation as well as other important parts 
is for the same ﬁle the agent wants to download, it does not send a request itself, but only answers 
the other request. For reasons of simplicity this case is omitted from the decision tree and it is 
assumed that it has not received any matching requests. 
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of the simulation. 
Jason uses AgentSpeak (Rao, 1996) for describing agent behaviour, thus fol­
lowing the Beliefs – Desires – Intentions (BDI) model of agency (Rao and Georgeff, 
1995). BDI architectures originated in the work of the Rational Agency project 
at Stanford Research Institute in the mid-1980s. The main idea of BDI is that 
computer programs (i.e. the agents in the simulation) are viewed as if they have 
a “mental state”. Thus, when programming the agents, computational analogues 
of beliefs, desires and intentions are used, enabling a form of reasoning by agents 
about their goals and the different options to achieve them. 
Beliefs are information the agent has about the world. This information could 
be out of date or inaccurate, of course, however they represent the agent’s view of 
the world. Desires are all the possible states of affairs that the agent might like to 
accomplish. Having a desire, however, does not imply that an agent acts upon it: 
they only potentially inﬂuence an agent’s actions. Finally, intentions are the states 
of affairs that the agent has decided to work towards. Intentions may be goals that 
are delegated to the agent, or may result from considering options: we think of an 
agent looking at its options and choosing between them. Options that are selected 
in this way become intentions. Therefore, one can imagine an agent starting with 
some delegated goal, and then considering the possible options that are compatible 
with this delegated goal; the options that it chooses are then intentions, to which 
the agent is committed (Bordini et al., 2007). 
Jason makes use of the BDI concept by repeatedly executing the following 
control loop: (i) the individual agents look at the world, perceive their environ­
ment and other agents, and update their individual beliefs on this basis (it is im­
portant to note that not all agents perceive the same, but have individual percepts 
that can be different for each agent); (ii) as a result they deliberate to decide which 
individual intention to achieve; (iii) and use means-ends reasoning to ﬁnd a plan 
(a step of actions) to achieve this intention; (iv) in the last step the agents then 
execute the plan in order to fulﬁll the intention. 
In our simulation all environmental related aspects as well as the mathematical 
calculation of utilities by the individual agents are programmed in Java, whereas 
the agents’ reasoning about goals and actions is implemented in AgentSpeak. In 
addition, the Java component of Jason was used for logging the states of the MAS. 
5.3.2. Time 
An important aspect of any system designed to model action and change is 
how it deals with the problem of representing time. As is pointed out (Allen, 
1991) a number of methods have been found to be useful in different areas of 
22

artiﬁcial intelligence, including representations based on explicit dating, intervals, 
and temporal logics (Cliffe, 2007). For the purposes of this paper we assume a 
model of time consisting of a set of totally ordered time instants for the agents’ 
actions, such that at each point exactly one “real-world” event may occur. In this 
respect we do not make any assumptions about durations of real time which may 
take place between these instants. With regard to the download times and the 
resulting energy consumption, we use the ﬁle size and the data-rates (and power 
values) given in Tables 1 and 2 to determine the respective values regardless of 
the model of time consistency. 
5.3.3. The Notion of Location 
One last implementation aspect that will be discussed brieﬂy, is that of loca­
tion. This is also important, as the movement of agents in the model and their 
respective location in the system and in relation to other agents determines poten­
tial cooperation options. 
For cooperation to take place, an agent must be in the proximity of other 
agents. An accurate Cartesian model of location is not actually necessary, so 
we represent an agent’s location as a number between 0 and 1 and proximity is 
determined by a search interval [location − x, location + x], which the agent uses 
to ﬁnd cooperation partners. 
5.3.4. Simulation Variables and Results 
Having discussed the implementation aspects of the MAS simulation, in this 
section we now describe the simulation experiments and the results collected. 
For the simulation experiments we used a very similar scenario as in the design 
time case, but without an enforcement mechanism. Table 4(a) gives an overview 
of the parameters that can be used to control the simulation9 at the start of the 
experiment. 
The simulation parameters comprise, the number of the agents in the simu­
lation, the duration of the simulation (i.e. the number of interactions for which 
the simulation is running), the size of the partner search interval that is used for 
proximity determination as well as the location-based information, i.e. the mobil­
ity model and the mobility levels of the agents. The mobility level is a number 
9The variables that result from agent decision or are agent speciﬁc such as perceived risks, etc. 
are not part of the simulation parameters as they cannot be altered directly. The perceived system 
risk was artiﬁcially inﬂuenced externally for one set of experiments, which is why it is listed in 
parentheses in Table 4(a). 
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Table 4: Simulation Speciﬁcations 
(a) Simulation Variables (b) Simulation Parameters 
Name Range/Type 
Agents [2, ∞] 
Interactions [1, ∞] 
Mobility Level [0, 1] 
Movement Model Random Walk, Levy Flight,.. 
Partner Search Interval [0, 1] 
(Perceived System Risk) [0,1] 
Enforcement [true, false] 
Name Simulation Parameters 
Agents 2000 
Interactions 50 
Mobility Level uniform distribution 
Movement Model Random Walk 
Partner Search Interval 0.1 
(Perceived System Risk) 0, 1 
Enforcement [true, false] 
between 0 and 1 that is assigned individually to each agent. It controls how far an 
agent can move. The closer the value is to 0, the less distance an agent can move, 
whereas a level of 1 indicates moving long distances. The idea is that elderly peo­
ple for example will move around the same place whereas business people might 
move further on a regular basis (e.g. to meetings) for example. 
For the simulation run we used a uniform distribution of the mobility level 
between all agents. Further parameters of the simulation runs can be seen in Table 
4(b). 
For the movement pattern, we started with a random walk. Thus, taking mo­
bility level into account, a random number between 0 and 1 is drawn in order to 
determine the new location. The interaction count was set at 50, while the size of 
the agent population was set at 2000. Finally, the partner search interval was set to 
0.1 and the perceived system risk was to be determined by all agents themselves 
or set to 0 and 1 as indirect ﬁxed values. 
In order to test the effects of the agent decision on the cooperation and as a 
consequence on battery consumption, we have executed fractional factorial exper­
iments. A factorial experiment is an experiment whose design consists of two or 
more factors, each with discrete possible values or “levels”, and whose experimen­
tal units take on all possible combinations of these levels across all the factors. Our 
experiments consisted of running a number of simulations (50) for the parameter 
combinations in Table 4(b). The logﬁles of these runs were then analysed using 
Matlab. The most interesting results of these experiments are shown in Figure 8. 
The ﬁgures show the boxplots of the average cumulative energy consumption 
by all agents in different simulation experiments. The results of these simulation 
experiments were logged and the resulting datasets analyzed with Matlab. In the 
simulation experiments resulting in datasets 1 and 2 the perceived system risk was 
set to 0, whereas in the simulation corresponding to dataset 3 it was set to 1. As a 
result of this, in the simulations for datasets 3, the system perception by the agents 
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Figure 8: Battery Costs in the Simulation 
is classiﬁed as too risky (as no enforcement is in place at all) and as a consequence 
the agents already at node 2 in the decision tree, choose to download everything 
themselves. What distinguishes the experiments responsible for datasets 1 and 2 is 
the usage of enforcement. Thus, in the ﬁrst simulation experiment no enforcement 
was being used whereas in the second set of experiments we applied enforcement 
by altering economic considerations by agents, as also proposed by Leo´n et al. 
(2009). Thus, we introduced a very high sanctioning fee, that made cheating very 
expensive for agents and therefore lead to them considering cooperation instead 
of cheating. 
From the results, one can clearly see that in case 1, i.e. when no enforcement 
is in place and the system risk is perceived to be low, the energy consumption 
costs are highest. They are even higher than case 3, where due to the perceived 
high system risk no cooperation is considered by the agents. The reason for this 
effect is that the agents as a result of the low perceived system risk in case 1, enter 
negotiation, for which energy is needed to agree the negotiation group as well as 
on the ﬁle to download for example. However when the actual sharing is supposed 
to take place, as a result of the utility considerations and no enforcement mech­
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anism being in place, the agents decide to cheat, resulting in them not receiving 
any chunks from cooperation partners and having eventually to download every­
thing themselves as a result. Thus, no energy saving is possible from the short 
link cooperation and furthermore they have to face additional battery costs for the 
negotiation. 
One further interesting result appears when comparing case 2 with the other 
results. Case 2 includes a basic enforcement concept in form of a fee (sanction) 
being applied if agents are caught cheating. It therefore shows the potential gains 
(in terms of battery) possible in a wireless grid, if enforcment is possible and 
successfull. Thus in case 2 the energy consumed is approximately 3.37 times 
less than in case 1 and approximately 3.019 times less then in case 3, implying 
that given the speciﬁc setting of the simulation experiments, a 70% energy saving 
(with regard to case 1) could be achieved. 
5.4. Evaluation 
With the help of the MAS simulation, we are able to observe the individual 
agent decisions as well as the impact of these decisions on the system as a whole 
(i.e. the macro level). As expected from the economic analysis in Section 2.2 
the results of the simulation show that without any enforcement mechanism in 
place the theoretical advantages of wireless grids are at stake and might even 
result in the opposite, i.e. higher energy consumption due to additional negotiation 
messages. These results were stable throughout the factorial experiments and are 
good reference point for exploring enforcement in wireless grids further. 
The results indicate the importance and the potential impact of successful en­
forcement in wireless grids, and any NGMN of this kind in the future, and can be 
extended to give valuable empirical evidence of the potential impact of enforce­
ment mechanisms at an early prototyping stage. This is particularly important in 
the early prototyping stage, when wireless grids are not being actually deployed 
at large and the simulation may uncover possible weaknesses and strengths before 
costly tests with real people and hardware are conducted. 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we have presented a normative framework and a MAS simulation 
as complementary mechanisms to help understand and to model the economic 
challenges that might arise in the context of a speciﬁc NGMN scenario, namely 
wireless grids. 
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Using the design time model of a normative frameworks, we were able to 
quantify communication costs for the particular case of a 3G structured network 
and an Ethernet ad-hoc network as well examine the traces for expected and unex­
pected behaviour. Thus, with the help of the design time model, system properties 
can be checked as well as validated. Whereas the design time model focuses on 
the system and its properties as a whole and reasons about the validity of system 
states, the runtime model complements this approach. Hence, the MAS simula­
tion gives insights into the individual behaviour and decision-making of the agents 
at the runtime of the simulation and thus allows for a micro-macro view. “Micro”, 
meaning the individual decision making by the agents, that however culminates in 
a “macro” result, i.e. a global system-wide emergent behaviour. 
Both, the runtime as well as the design time model are currently necessarily 
simpliﬁed and demand expansion, as pointed out in Sections 4.2 and 5.4. For 
example, in the MAS simulation, points that need development include the size of 
the agent population and the movement model. Further aspects of interest to be 
included in the model are error rates on the different communication paths as well 
as more elaborate models for the negotiation (e.g. some agents having some parts 
of the ﬁles already). 
The modelling of the wireless grid scenario gave us also a good insight into 
our formal model. The model does not allow us to expel an agent completely from 
a normative framework, as all the observed events are automatically empowered. 
While this can be partially remedied by removing the empowerment of consequent 
normative events, as we have done in the sharing phase, it raises interesting issues 
on how membership of a normative framework should be handled. 
One important aspect that needs to be investigated more deeply in both models 
are the enforcement mechanisms. As presented in this paper, the design time 
model makes use of an enforcement mechanism that assumes the possibility to 
observe all actions by the agents and that the normative framework has the power 
to carry out the sanction of not allowing downloads, if the handset has not shared 
chunks. The runtime model in contrast does employ enforcement mechanism by 
threattening agents with such high sanctioning costs, that they will most likely aim 
for the cooperation option. It goes not into detail on how the enforcement works in 
detail and does not compare different enforcement approaches, but demonstrates 
the necessity for a more in depth analysis of possible enforcement mechanisms. 
Also, in their speciﬁc implementation, both models have given valuable insights 
into the cooperation problem in wireless grids and extending them with realistic 
(i.e. more subtle, and less draconian) enforcement mechanisms. One ﬁrst step 
in this direction has been taken, in form of a classiﬁcation of possible different 
27

enforcement options, was presented at a Dagstuhl seminar Balke (2009). With 
the help of the two complementary modelling approaches, we will implement the 
different enforcement mechanisms in the models and compare and evaluate the 
success and utility of them. 
One particular focus in this comparison/evaluation will be the effects the mech­
anisms have on the different stakeholders of the system. The points is that if such 
wireless grids are realized, it is not only users that will be affected, but also the 
infrastructure providers and mobile phone manufacturers. As these groups may 
have different goals with regard to wireless grids, their perception of the success 
or utility of an enforcement mechanisms might vary. The need to balance the 
different interests of these stakeholders therefore displays interesting aspects for 
future research. 
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